Das Qualitative Zufriedenheitsmodell : (QZM)
The one question Conservatives need to answer before they say anything. First of all, we collect data on own funds, financial reporting, large exposures, sovereign exposures, credit and operational risk losses, leverage ratios, market risk sensitivities, asset-liability structures, funding plans and others.
Rather, risk management and internal governance — the cause of trouble in a number of banks — can only be assessed with a lot of supervisory judgement. But the financial crisis also showed that the quantity and quality of capital held by institutions was insufficient and did not allow them to absorb the losses they incurred. Judging from this experience, it does not seem advisable for supervisors to rely only on qualitative supervision. Anyway, both quantitative and qualitative supervision are an obligation under the Capital Requirements Directive IV, which requires us to determine whether an institution has sufficient capital and liquidity to cover its risks.
We are even obliged to come up with our own numerical verdict, namely a decision on pillar 2 capital add-ons. Now how do we ensure that our SREP methodology adequately combines quantitative and qualitative supervision? First of all, we collect data on own funds, financial reporting, large exposures, sovereign exposures, credit and operational risk losses, leverage ratios, market risk sensitivities, asset-liability structures, funding plans and others.
This manifold set of data is produced by banks following harmonised standards and it is then used in an automated process to generate initial risk scores and supervisory risk estimates. The idea behind this is to provide consistency between the assessments of all institutions by producing objective quantitative anchor points.
There will always be institutions with idiosyncrasies which cannot be captured by automated algorithms. Rather, we are fully aware of and account for the fact that all standardised rating methodologies are, by their very nature, limited. This institution-specific qualitative assessment uses up most of the supervisory resources in the SREP. If this were not done, too many aspects that are key for the viability of institutions could not be factored in.
Furthermore, we do not just conduct quantitative and qualitative assessments separately. We work hard to combine both approaches in our methodology by bringing together the strengths of both concepts. Let me explain briefly the structure of this SREP methodology. The slide shows that it consists of four main elements:. All four elements are assessed and rated. Of these four SREP elements, only the internal governance assessment is purely qualitative, while all other elements are assessed as a combination of quantitative anchor points and qualitative assessments, based on supervisory judgement.
One example of the combination of quantitative and qualitative supervision is our pillar 2 add-on quantification methodology. Although at first glance a purely quantitative concept, qualitative elements play a key role in this methodology. The respective risk controls are assessed in a purely qualitative manner, and then combined with risk-level assessments that consist of a combination of quantitative anchor points and a holistic, judgement-based assessment.
In order to determine potential capital needs for the future, our capital determination process is rooted in a strong quantitative fundament; but at the same time, we apply supervisory judgement, for example when selecting adequate stress testing scenarios and when combining the outcomes of the different risk perspectives that are reflected in the three blocks.
Another principle underlying our methodology, namely the principle of proportionality, is linked to the qualitative part of our approach. Let me speak briefly about the results of this capital determination process and our expectations for the future. Using our SREP methodology for the first time this year, the average pillar 2 capital requirements have slightly increased compared to the previous year by a margin of 30 basis points without buffer effects and by 50 basis points with buffer phase-in, adding up to an average requirement of Obviously, this is not a dramatic increase, nonetheless it allows for a gradual transition towards fully loaded Basel III requirements.
From my perspective the current level of pillar 2 capital requirements is generally adequate in the sense that I regard it as sufficient to cover the current risk exposures across significant institutions. After speaking so much about supervisory judgement, let me elaborate briefly on how we ensure a level playing field. The SSM is obliged to treat institutions in a fair and equal manner; within our single market, we have to provide a level playing field among institutions.
And the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism is a major step in this direction. There is a range of measures in our SREP process and methodology for ensuring a level playing field. First of all, our supervisors follow a common SREP methodology that guides their judgement.
In addition, extensive peer comparisons for all the different parts of the SREP contribute to a consistent exercise of supervisory judgement across all SREP elements and decisions in all institutions. It is certainly a big step forward with regard to equal treatment; we can now conduct peer comparisons for significant institutions in a far more meaningful and powerful manner, given the fact that, firstly, we can create more meaningful peer groups and, secondly, we have a prominent role for quantitative SREP elements that allow for easier comparisons.
Overall, we had four distinct rounds of intensive horizontal analyses throughout the SREP At the same time, global warming appears to be speeding up the hydrologic cycle, making wet areas wetter, and dry areas drier.
In short, more water will soon be required to slake the thirst of a world that many say is already using too much. For instance, Singapore has been buying water from Malaysia, and Israel has considered a similar agreement with Turkey.
Greenland, newly flush with glacial runoff thanks to global warming, is looking to export surplus supplies, according to its deputy minister of foreign affairs. If water distribution was privatized, prices for individual consumers would likely increase with use, which would have the positive side effect of encouraging conservation. Prices for industry and agriculture, which use 20 and 70 per cent respectively, would likely use a tiered system. Some worry that charging market prices for water could lead to humanitarian concerns: In the developing world, only the economically powerful—industry, agriculture and elites—have access to running water, says Ashok Gadgil, senior staff scientist with the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
People living in slums and rural areas do without. In Kibera, a sprawling Nairobi slum—the biggest in Africa—the only way to get water is through a network of porters that provide water to , people a day, hauling it in canisters on their backs or by donkey.
By some estimates, more than half the population of cities in the developing world get their water this way. Activists who warn against the dangers of privatization are right to be wary. Trading water is not like trading oil or softwood lumber: Olson, one of the top environmental lawyers in the U.